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A PRIMER ON THE ORIGINS AND
IMPLICATIONS OF
THE THOMAS BECKET AFFAIR
R. Jason Richards*
Chorus: Here let us stand, close by the cathedral. Here
let us wait. Are we drawn by danger? Is it the
knowledge of safety, that draws our feet towards the
cathedral? What danger can be for us, the poor, the
poor women of Canterbury? What tribulation with
which we are not already familiar? There is no danger
for us, and there is no safety in the cathedral. Some
presage of an act which our eyes are compelled to
witness, has forced our feet towards the cathedral. We
are forced to bear witness.1
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines the twelfth century controversy between
Henry II and Archbishop Thomas Becket. Although the struggle
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between these two individuals occurred during the distant centuries
in medieval England, the ramifications of their conflict remains with
us today, both spiritually and legally. It is for this reason that we
explore this topic again.
II. CANON LAW
Before the Norman Conquest, the Catholic Church’s influence
was not widespread in England.2 As a result, there existed in England
a singular tribunal consisting of both the bishop and the Earl whose
responsibility it was to determine all controversies of legal
significance, both lay and ecclesiastical.3 Accordingly, no distinct
separation existed between church courts and secular courts prior to
the Conquest.4 Not only were the two courts closely linked, but
initially, the mood of the ecclesiastical courts and royal courts
generally was one of compromise and reconciliation.5 Over time,
however, the legal disputes between lay and ecclesiastical members of
the two competing establishments would become increasingly
contentious. This, in turn, lead William the Conqueror to carry out
the promise he had made prior to his conquest of England – to set up
separate ecclesiastical courts in England in exchange for the Pope’s
blessing of his ideological campaign.6 In doing so, he removed suits
“which belong to the government of souls” from lay tribunals to
ecclesiastical tribunals, thereby permitting the legal separation of the
two courts.7 It was through this division that William, perhaps
unintentionally, set in motion the struggle between church and state
courts that would last well beyond his reign.8 William’s approach
disrupted the traditional cooperative atmosphere that had previously
existed between bishops and laypeople.9 Before William’s reign,
ROSCOE POUND, THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 40 (New
York: P.F. Collier & Sons, 1939).
3 W.R. Jones, The Two Laws in England: The Later Middle Ages, 11 J. CHURCH &
ST. 111, 116 (1969)
4 Jack Moser, The Secularization of Equity: Ancient Religious Origins, Feudal
Christian Influences, and Medieval Authorization Impacts on the Evolution of Legal
Equitable Remedies, 26 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 483, 515 (1997).
5 Id.
6 Id. at 516.
7 Id. at 517.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 519.
2
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ecclesiastical judges could participate in the adjudicatory procedures
of state courts, and bring actions of an ecclesiastical nature before the
secular courts to be decided according to temporal laws.10 After the
division of power, however, they could do neither of these things.
By necessity, the dispensation of justice would thereafter be
determined by two types of courts – ecclesiastical and secular (lay)
jurisdictions.11 Not surprisingly, church courts did not implement
English customary law in administering justice within their own
tribunals; rather, these new ecclesiastical courts applied the medieval
canon law of the Catholic Church.12 Because these canon precedents
were strongly based on Roman Law, they were by this time a wellestablished body of developed law, especially in the areas of crime
and criminal procedure.13 For this reason, church courts claimed the
authority to preside over a wide range of legal issues.
To illustrate, the English church courts dealt not only with
crimes and public offenses against morality, but also with secular
matters.14 Ecclesiastical courts claimed broad authority to regulate
virtually every aspect of daily life of lay society, both among the
clergy and the laity.15 They believed they were endowed not only
with the legal right but also the moral duty to subvert all religious or
moral ideas that deviated from traditional orthodox Christian
norms.16 Unorthodox views, they believed, threatened not only the
salvation of the individual, but also threatened to infect society in
general.17 As one commentator summarily stated, “[i]t would have
Id. at 517.
Id.
12 Id. At the time of Henry I (1100-1135), England had a strong administrative
mechanism for resolving disputes, but the mechanism relied more on AngloSaxon law as it had evolved from local custom than from any real common
law system. POUND, supra note 2, at 41. The body of law known as the
common law would not begin to evolve in England until the reign of Henry
II (c. 1154). Id.
13 R.H. Helmholz, The Early History of the Grand Jury and the Canon Law, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 613, 617 (1983).
14 Id.
15 THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 219
(Rochester, New York: Lawyer’s Co-operative, 1929); JAMES A. BRUNDAGE,
MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 70 (New York, New York: Longman Group, 1995).
16 Id.
17 Id.
10
11
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been difficult, indeed almost impossible, for an individual, regardless
of social status or occupation, to remain untouched from one year’s
end to the next by the canonical regulations.”18 It was on this basis
that church authorities claimed the right to regulate all commercial
and non-commercial activity, matters of a sexual nature, legitimacy
issues, labor concerns, testamentary succession, matters relating to the
poor and disadvantaged, and the burial of the dead.19 Throughout
this period the church courts endeavored to make their legal system
conform as much as possible to the ideal of Christian conduct, and to
lessen the gap between law and moral conduct.20
Similarly, ecclesiastical courts claimed the right to prosecute
and, if necessary, excommunicate those individuals whose views
offended the church’s values.21 The most frequently tried issues in
church courts were those of a criminal nature,22 for church authorities
had to try all crimes committed by clerics (or clerks) of whatever
description.23 Thus, anyone who enjoyed the privileges of clerical
status – monks, hermits, nuns, and the like – were subject to the
jurisdiction of the church.24 It is important to note, however, while
the church may have cast a wide net insofar as its claim of authority
to resolve legal actions among clergy and laypersons alike, its
assertions were at all times subject to the power granted the church
courts by the English crown.25 For this reason, conflicts would soon
arise between the church and crown with respect to their courts’
perceived interests and responsibilities.
First, the needs and demands of an individual claimant would
often-times determine, or at least encourage, which court the claimant
would petition for relief.26 In other words, whether a claim was
Id. at 96.
Id. at 71.
20 PLUCKNETT, supra note 15, at 218.
21 Id. Under canon law, “excommunication was the most serious sanction the
Church had to wield against those who disobeyed its laws.” Richard H.
Helmholtz, Excommunication in Twelfth Century England, 11 J. L. & RELIG. 235,
236 (1994-95).
22 Helmholz, supra note 13, at 618.
23 BRUNDAGE, supra note 15, at 71.
24 Id.
25 Jones, supra note 3, at 114.
26 Id. at 115.
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brought or heard in courts of church or crown often depended upon
the relief sought.27 For instance, canon law favored the flexible
disposition of property by testament, while English customary law
preferred conveyances in accordance with established rules.28 A byproduct of this consumer choice (or “forum shopping” as it is known
today) was that each of the courts would feverishly work to safeguard
their own jurisdictions from the encroachment by the other, while at
the same time seek to draw as many claimants to their own tribunals
as possible.29
A second factor contributing to this dissension concerned the
uncertainty and ambiguity surrounding particular pleas or else the
complex legal issues presented for review in any particular case,
which, depending on the how the claim was viewed by any particular
court and what method of proof would be used in the case might
determine how the issue was decided.30 One source of tension
concerned the large number of disputes about land between bishops
and laypeople. Again, the question concerned what method of proof
would be used to determine the controversy.31 While trial by battle
was unacceptable to the church, documentary evidence or witness
testimony was unacceptable to the king.32 Generally speaking, such
disputes were generated by both laymen and clergy, who were
attempting to exploit jurisdictional rivalries for personal wealth or
advantage.33 Individual claimants were pleading their case to
whatever court could resolve them, regardless of the pretensions of
either jurisdiction.34
A third complicating factor was that the crown courts came to
resent the sweeping jurisdictional claims of the ecclesiastical courts
and, more importantly, claimed the authority to define the boundaries
of the church’s jurisdiction – a claim that church authorities strongly

Id.
BRUNDAGE, supra note 15, at 97.
29 Id.
30 Jones, supra note 3, at 115.
31 Charles Donahue, Jr., Biology and the Origins of the English Jury, 17 LAW &
HIST. REV. 591, 593 (1999).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
27
28
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contested.35 Superior power rested with the crown, which, if
necessary, could halt any procedures of the Christian courts which
infringed or threatened to infringe upon the authority of the crown,
and could similarly punish those ecclesiastical judges who disobeyed
the crown’s commands.36 It is not difficult to understand that the two
legal systems could not co-exist once their shared goals continued to
erode and the distrust between the crown and church became more
and more apparent.37 The controversy between King Henry II and
Archbishop Thomas Becket brings to bear the intensity of this conflict.
III. THE BECKET AFFAIR
In 1154, Henry II’s reign as King of England began. Henry,
like many rulers before him, believed the Catholic Church in general
and the Pope in particular had too much authority in England.38
“Accordingly, Henry sought to assert his own position of power by
decreasing the power of the English bishops in whom the Pope’s
authority was vested.”39 In furtherance of this goal, he appointed his
friend and colleague, Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury.40
However, Becket’s views were not completely aligned with those of
Henry.41 Becket advocated “clerical immunity” – a system in which
the church, relying upon the canon law principle that clerks had to be
tried in church courts, permitted its holy order to escape the authority
of the royal courts in cases of alleged wrongdoing.42 The right of the
church courts, Becket believed, was central to the authority of the
Church, and he insisted on enforcing its prerogatives.43
“Henry, however, believed ‘criminous’ clerks, like other
criminals, should be brought before the King’s court.”44 Henry’s
Richard H. Helmholtz, Conflicts Between Religious and Secular Law: Common
Themes in the English Experience, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 707, 709 (1991).
36 Jones, supra note 3, at 114.
37 Moser, supra note 4, at 517.
38 Peter D. Jason, The Courts Christian in Medieval England, 37 CATHOLIC LAW.
339, 342 (1997).
39 Id. at 342-43.
40 Id. at 343.
41 Id.
42 Moser, supra note 4, at 521.
43 Id.
44 Jason, supra note 38, at 344.
35
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principle concern was that the doctrine of clerical immunity was
being abused by many of his ecclesiastical subjects, in the desire to
circumvent the authority of the crown’s courts and seek relief under
the more hospitable ecclesiastical courts.45 To be sure, many royal
subjects assumed the role of “clerks” as a means of saving themselves
from prosecution under the crown.46
In response, Henry published the Constitutions of Clarendon
in 1164, which was designed to expand the power of the crown at the
expense of church courts and to end what he believed to be
jurisdictional overreaching by church authorities.47 Henry published
sixteen Constitutions in all.48 Not surprisingly, Henry’s actions
brought an immediate response from the Pope, who promptly
denounced “ten of the Constitutions, four of which concerned the
jurisdiction of church courts.”49 More important for our purposes,
however, was the controversy that erupted between Becket and
Henry II with respect to the Constitutions.
Becket was concerned that the jurisdictional reforms set up by
Henry provided the possibility of double punishment (now known as
the concept of “double jeopardy”), as Henry’s plan permitted the
prosecution of crimes in both the ecclesiastical and King’s courts.50
Becket, however, believed that when a person may be tried by either
court and has been tried by one, it was intolerable that he should be
tried again for the same crime.51 Becket insisted there should be but
one trial, and naturally, that any such trial should be before the
ecclesiastical courts since clerics were exempt from secular criminal
process by virtue of their religious standing.52 Becket perceived
Henry’s authority as an unlawful concentration of power in the crown
Moser, supra note 4, at 520.
Id.
47 Id.
48 Jason, supra note 38, at 343.
49 Id.
50 Id. at n. 35. More specifically, Henry’s Clarendon declaration pronounced,
among other things, that “while jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was
retained over felonies less than treason committed by ecclesiastical
personnel, the punishment itself could be carried out only by the royal
courts.” Moser, supra note 4, at 521.
51 POUND, supra note 2, at 41.
52 Id.
45
46
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and as an assault upon the liberty of the Church – a stance that would
make him a martyr for his cause.53
Conversely, Henry insisted upon the supremacy of the crown,
at least in matters of lay relations.54 This matter of jurisdiction was
the core of the conflict between these two old friends.55 And it was for
this right that Becket struggled to preserve the liberty and authority of
the church, and it was for this cause that he would ultimately lose his
life also, surprisingly enough, at the hands (at least indirectly) of his
old friend.56 At the height of their controversy, Becket was murdered
by four loyal subjects of Henry II who, perhaps mistakenly, perceived
Henry’s ill-fated remark “Who will free me from this turbulent
priest?” as a directive from Henry to kill Becket.57 Under the auspices
of this royal “mandate,” four of Henry’s knights took it upon
themselves to assassinate Becket on the floor of the Canterbury
Cathedral in 1170.58
The public outrage surrounding Becket’s assassination forced
Henry II to repent and submit to the authority of the Pope for his role
in Becket’s death.59 But more than anything else, he did this for the
sake of restoring unity in England.60 After Becket’s death, Henry was
forced to limit the state’s power over ecclesiastical courts – limits that
survive today throughout the West.61 Indeed, the principle of
separation of church and state entered the formal canon law soon
after Becket’s death, declaring void any statute that contravened
ecclesiastical liberty.62 These limits were instrumental in creating a
Edward McGlynn Gaffnery, Jr., The Principled Resignation of Thomas More,
31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 63, 69-70 (1997).
54 Id.
55 Jason, supra note 38, at 343.
56 R.H. Helmholtz, Magna Carta and the Ius Commune, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 297,
313 (1999).
57 Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 729, 738 (1990).
58 Marvin Zalman, et al., Michigan’s Assisted Suicide Three Ring Circus – An
Intersection of Law and Politics, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 863, 901 n. 178 (1997).
59 Jason, supra note 38, at 343.
60 Abbe Smith & William Montrose, The Calling of Criminal Matters, 50
MERCER L. REV. 443, 515 n. 491 (1991).
61 Jason, supra note 38, at 344.
62 Helmholtz, supra note 56, at 313.
53
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balance between the state and the individual by curtailing the
absolute power of the state to regulate all matters.
Upon reflection, Henry’s actions can be explained as a
campaign to displace the power of the Church in the temporal and
spiritual affairs of England and to establish one rule of law in all of
England.63 Becket, on the other hand, “attempted to establish that
human law was in the shadow of divine law, appealing to a law
greater than the law articulated by Henry II.”64 Despite the
unfortunate circumstances surrounding the Becket affair, it is fair to
say that the struggle contributed greatly to the development of a body
of law that remains with us to this day.
Through his efforts to limit the ecclesiastical jurisdiction and
his powerful royal in the administration of justice, Henry II developed
a body of law suited for the needs of England at the time, and it is
through the rise of the system of courts laid down in the century to
follow Henry II that served as the foundation of the common law. 65
Similarly, it was Thomas Becket’s adherence to the equitable
principles of canon law that was primarily responsible for bringing
about the adoption of the concept of double jeopardy in the common
law.
IV. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the jurisdictional struggle between the courts
in twelfth century England generally, and the rivalry between Henry
II and Becket specifically, reflected the political controversy and
power struggles of the era. The secularization of equity was an
arduous and deadly process. On a larger scale, however, the Becket
affair provides the bedrock upon which our common law and modern
notions of legal equity rest. And while contemporary courts may
have obviated the need for ecclesiastical courts inasmuch as modern
judges now resort to the use of equitable remedies as a means of
achieving a just and fair result in our courts, the origins of such
equitable relief properly lye in medieval England.

Moser, supra note 4, at 522.
Smith & Montrose, supra note 60, at 515 n. 491.
65 POUND, supra note 2, at 42.
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